Signing for safety: Can mandatory marriage registration reduce domestic violence?

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## Introduction

- Alarming growth in the number of domestic violence cases in recent years.
- Negative impact on women's mental and physical health.
    - (Campbell, 2002; Ackerson and Subramanian, 2008)
- Adverse intergenerational effect on children's health, cognitive development and school participation.
    - (Aizer, 2011; Carrell and Hoekstra, 2010; Ahmed et al., 2006)
- Problem becomes more acute with pre-existing patriarchal norms and societal taboos related to reporting of domestic violence, which calls for strong policy interventions.
- **In this paper, we study the impact of a mandatory marriage registration policy on domestic violence in India.**

## Contribution

- We highlight the role of a novel determinant of domestic violence - the lack of legal documentation of marriage.
  - Contributes to research on socioeconomic and demographic factors that lead to domestic violence (Aizer, 2010; Tur-Prats, 2019; Amaral and Bhalotra, 2017; Erten and Keskin, 2018).
- We focus on how institutional changes can influence social norms related to violence against women.
  - Contributes to the broader literature that highlights the critical role of institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Duflo and Pande, 2007).
- First to evaluate the impact of mandatory marriage registration as a policy intervention.
  - Contributes to research on effectiveness of policy measures in reducing violence against women (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2006; Bobonis et al., 2013; Aizer and Dal Bo, 2009).
- We demonstrate how corruption can impede the effectiveness of policy interventions using an event study analysis.
  - How corruption can hinder public service delivery (Davis, 2004; Pandey, 2010; Deininger and Mpuga, 2005).

## Policy Context

- In India, no unified law for mandatory marriage registration.
- State governments decide their own policies.
- Inconsistent implementation and enforcement across the country.
- Mandatory marriage registration policy in the state of Bihar (2006).
- Every couple is required to register their marriages within 30 days.
- Failure to comply results in a monetary penalty of Rs. 100 imposed on the husband for up to 90 days, with an additional Rs. 50 penalty for each subsequent month of non-compliance.
- Submission of false documents or false witnesses is subject to prosecution under Section 192 of IPC.

Methodology

- Difference-in-differences (DID)
- Treatment state: Bihar
- Control state: Jharkhand (neighbouring state)
- Treatment group: Women who got married after 2006
- Control group: Women who got married before 2006

$$Y_{imds} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Bihar_i * Post_{im} + X'_{ids}\gamma + \delta_m + \theta_{ds} + \epsilon_{imds}$$

## Data Source

### Table 1: Summary Statistics

- National Family Health Survey (2015-16)

- Sample: Women selected for domestic violence module

- Age group: 15-49

- Year of marriage in between 2002-15

- Non-resident women are excluded

- Additional mechanism outcomes from men's file

| | Description | Observations | Mean (S.D) |
|---|---|---|---|
| **A. Domestic Violence Outcomes** | | | |
| Emotional Violence | A dummy variable that takes value 1 if the woman has ever been humiliated or threatened or insulted or made feel bad by her husband; 0 otherwise | 3219 | 0.163 (0.370) |
| Sexual Violence | A dummy variable that takes value 1 if the woman has ever been physically forced into unwanted sex or sexual activities by her husband; 0 otherwise | 3219 | 0.119 (0.324) |
| Physical Violence | A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the woman has ever been pushed/had something thrown at/slapped/ punched/hit/kicked/dragged/strangled/burnt/threatened with weapons; 0 otherwise | 3219 | 0.371 (0.483) |
| Any Violence | A dummy variable that takes value 1 if the woman has ever been experienced emotional or sexual or physical violence; 0 otherwise | 3219 | 0.406 (0.491) |
| **B. Mechanism Outcomes** | | | |
| Polygamy | A dummy variable that takes value 1 if the woman's husband has more than one wives; 0 otherwise | 3245 | 0.025 (0.155) |
| Alcohol consump. (wife reported) | A dummy variable that takes value 1 if the woman reports that husband drinks alcohol; 0 otherwise | 3219 | 0.377 (0.485) |
| Alcohol consump. (husb reported) | A dummy variable that takes value 1 if the husband reports that he drinks alcohol; 0 otherwise | 3071 | 0.269 (0.444) |
| Justify violence (Husband/wife) | A dummy variable taking value 1 if the husband justifies wife-beating in case the wife goes out without permission/neglects children/argues with husband/refuses to have sex with husband/does not cook properly; 0 otherwise. | 3071 | 0.421 (0.494) |
| Age at Marriage | The woman's age when she got married | 3248 | 18.100 (3.177) |
| Child Marriage | A dummy variable that takes value 1 if the woman's age at marriage was below 18; and 0 otherwise | 3248 | 0.471 (0.499) |
| Literacy | A dummy variable that takes value 1 if the woman is literate; and 0 otherwise | 3248 | 0.590 (0.492) |
| Years of Education | Years of education of the woman | 3248 | 5.303 (5.185) |
| Awareness | A dummy variable that takes value 1 if the woman watches TV or listens to radio or reads newspaper regularly; 0 otherwise. This media exposure is taken as a proxy for awareness. | 3248 | 0.517 (0.500) |

**Note:** Source: Authors' calculation.

How can mandatory registration reduce domestic violence?

- Marriage certificate smoothens the process of filing a domestic violence case (Motiani, 2024).
  - For unregistered marriages, the husband can always deny any marital relation. The case automatically becomes obsolete if the woman can not prove the same in court.
  - Marriage registration certificate is an unequivocal and legally recognized proof of marriage in court (Buvinic and Carey, 2019).
- Marriage registration acts as a safety net for vulnerable women (Kumari et al., 2022).
  - Offers legal protection and rights (access to restraining orders, custody of children and even spousal support).
- Registration increases the accountability of the husband. The presence of witnesses makes the marriage public knowledge in society and thereby reduces the likelihood of the bride isolation.

## Impact of mandatory registration policy on domestic violence

Table 2: Impact of Mandatory Marriage Registration on Domestic Violence

|  | (1) Emotional Violence | (2) Sexual Violence | (3) Physical Violence | (4) All Violence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A. Without Controls |  |  |  |  |
| Treated x Post | -0.0820** | -0.0568* | -0.106** | -0.117** |
|  | (0.0384) | (0.0287) | (0.0460) | (0.0468) |
| R2 | 0.098 | 0.082 | 0.117 | 0.121 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.069 | 0.053 | 0.089 | 0.094 |
| p-value | 0.037 | 0.052 | 0.025 | 0.015 |
| Sharpened q-value | 0.052 | 0.052 | 0.052 | 0.052 |
| Wild-bootstrapped pvalue | 0.041 | 0.050 | 0.027 | 0.020 |
| B. With Controls |  |  |  |  |
| Treated x Post | -0.0870** | -0.0567** | -0.108*** | -0.116*** |
|  | (0.0350) | (0.0264) | (0.0393) | (0.0408) |
| R2 | 0.123 | 0.096 | 0.163 | 0.167 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.090 | 0.062 | 0.131 | 0.135 |
| p-value | 0.016 | 0.036 | 0.008 | 0.006 |
| Sharpened q-value | 0.017 | 0.019 | 0.017 | 0.019 |
| Wild-bootstrapped pvalue | 0.023 | 0.024 | 0.005 | 0.008 |
| Control Mean | 0.159 | 0.116 | 0.370 | 0.402 |
| Observations | 2439 | 2439 | 2439 | 2439 |

Note: * implies $p < 0.1$, ** implies $p < 0.05$ and *** implies $p < 0.01$. Source: Authors' calculation.

# Event study



**(a)** Emotional Violence

**(b)** Sexual Violence

**(c)** Physical Violence

**(d)** Any Violence

Right to Public Services Act

- In 2011, Bihar passed Right to Public Services (RTPS) Act.
- Objective: To increase accountability, reliability, accessibility and transparency in the public service delivery.
- Jharkhand also passed a similar act (Jharkhand Right to Service Act) in the same year.
- Follows the framework of central government's 'Citizens' Right to Grievance Redress Bill (2011).
- Corruption during the process of marriage registration.
- RTPS act curbed corruption and smoothened the process of registration.

Effectiveness of RTPS 2011

- 'Vital Statistics of India based on the Civil Registration System' (2009-2015).
- Annual data on total number of registration units inspected.
- Measure of the effectiveness of the registration procedure.
- Data available only for 7 states.

## Inspection of registration units in Bihar

Effectiveness of RTPS 2011

- Case study by OneWorld Foundation.
- 'Exemplary demand' from the citizens to procure public services within first two months.
- Registration department had a success rate of 92.5%.

## DID with post-2011 dummy

Table 3: Impact on Domestic Violence with Post-2011 interaction

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Emotional Violence | Physical Violence | Sexual Violence | All Violence |
| Treated x Post | -0.0167 | -0.0695 | -0.00388 | -0.0641 |
|  | (0.0410) | (0.0438) | (0.0368) | (0.0441) |
| Treated x Post 2011 | -0.152*** | -0.0833* | -0.114** | -0.113** |
|  | (0.0358) | (0.0419) | (0.0480) | (0.0458) |
| Observations | 2439 | 2439 | 2439 | 2439 |
| Control Mean | 0.159 | 0.116 | 0.370 | 0.402 |
| R2 | 0.131 | 0.164 | 0.102 | 0.169 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.097 | 0.132 | 0.067 | 0.136 |

**Note:** * implies $p < 0.1$, ** implies $p < 0.05$ and *** implies $p < 0.01$. Source: Authors' calculation.

## Mechanisms

Table 4: Impact of Mandatory Marriage Registration on Mechanism Outcomes

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Husband's Outcomes | | | | | | Women's Outcomes | | |
| | Polygamy | Alcohol Consumption (Wife-reported) | Alcohol Consumption (Husb. reported) | Justify Violence (Husband) | Age at Marriage | Child Marriage | Literacy | Years of Education | Awareness (Media-exposure) | Justify Violence (Wife) |
| **Without Controls** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Treated x Post | -0.0181** | -0.0781*** | -0.0799*** | -0.010 | 1.299*** | -0.164*** | 0.182*** | 2.038*** | 0.0740*** | -0.077*** |
| | (0.00860) | (0.0247) | (0.0253) | (0.021) | (0.181) | (0.0257) | (0.0201) | (0.194) | (0.0208) | (0.0234) |
| R2 | 0.028 | 0.074 | 0.081 | 0.076 | 0.097 | 0.070 | 0.083 | 0.107 | 0.097 | 0.099 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.009 | 0.055 | 0.062 | 0.057 | 0.079 | 0.052 | 0.065 | 0.090 | 0.080 | 0.081 |
| p-value | 0.039 | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.648 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Sharpned qvalue | 0.009 | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.07 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| **With Controls** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Treated x Post | -0.0182** | -0.0496* | -0.060** | -0.035* | 3.701*** | -0.419*** | 0.0988*** | 1.511*** | 0.0655*** | -0.059** |
| | (0.0075) | (0.0251) | (0.028) | (0.020) | (0.171) | (0.0235) | (0.0214) | (0.227) | (0.0237) | (0.0239) |
| R2 | 0.375 | 0.120 | 0.152 | 0.108 | 0.490 | 0.259 | 0.152 | 0.196 | 0.175 | 0.117 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.360 | 0.101 | 0.132 | 0.086 | 0.479 | 0.242 | 0.133 | 0.178 | 0.156 | 0.097 |
| p-value | 0.019 | 0.053 | 0.035 | 0.091 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.007 | 0.016 |
| Sharpned qvalue | 0.015 | 0.028 | 0.023 | 0.029 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.009 | 0.015 |
| Control Mean | 0.025 | 0.377 | 0.504 | 0.260 | 18.1 | 0.471 | 0.590 | 5.303 | 0.517 | 0.256 |
| Observations | 3245 | 3219 | 3071 | 3071 | 3248 | 3248 | 3248 | 3248 | 3248 | 3248 |

**Note:** * implies $p < 0.1$, ** implies $p < 0.05$ and *** implies $p < 0.01$. Source: Authors' calculation.

Change in the number of marriages registered

- Unavailability of data on marriages registered (Buvinic and Carey, 2019)
- Our estimates are ITT, not ATE
- RTI: District-wise annual data from 2002 to 2015 through an online RTI filing
- Obtained the data for two districts in Bihar: Araria and Bhagalpur

## Change in the number of marriages registered

## Heterogeneity Analysis

### Table 5: Heterogeneity Tests

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | Emotional Violence | Sexual Violence | Physical Violence | Any Violence |
| **A. Poor vs Non-poor** | | | | |
| Treated x Post | -0.143*** | -0.0826** | -0.192*** | -0.206*** |
|  | (0.0448) | (0.0359) | (0.0572) | (0.0596) |
| Treated x Post x Poor | 0.0941*** | 0.0396 | 0.132*** | 0.136*** |
|  | (0.0333) | (0.0316) | (0.0448) | (0.0426) |
| R2 | 0.103 | 0.083 | 0.122 | 0.127 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.074 | 0.054 | 0.094 | 0.099 |
| **B. Marginalized vs Non-marginalized caste** | | | | |
| Treated x Post | -0.150*** | -0.0772* | -0.241*** | -0.266*** |
|  | (0.0470) | (0.0411) | (0.0510) | (0.0574) |
| Treated x Post x Marginalized Caste | 0.0808*** | 0.0244 | 0.161*** | 0.178*** |
|  | (0.0249) | (0.0325) | (0.0331) | (0.0390) |
| R2 | 0.100 | 0.082 | 0.122 | 0.128 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.071 | 0.053 | 0.094 | 0.100 |
| **C. Rural vs. Urban** | | | | |
| Treated x Post | -0.0848** | -0.0501* | -0.108** | -0.116** |
|  | (0.0401) | (0.0288) | (0.0465) | (0.0466) |
| Treated x Post x Urban | 0.0182 | -0.0446 | 0.0131 | -0.00732 |
|  | (0.0433) | (0.0274) | (0.0446) | (0.0431) |
| R2 | 0.098 | 0.083 | 0.117 | 0.121 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.069 | 0.054 | 0.088 | 0.093 |
| Observations | 2439 | 2439 | 2439 | 2439 |

**Note:** * implies $p < 0.1$, ** implies $p < 0.05$ and *** implies $p < 0.01$. Source: Authors' calculation.

## Robustness Checks

- Balance check on observables
- Falsification test
- Placebo control state
- Placebo treatment year
- No anticipation assumption check
- PSM-DID
- Entropy bala

## Robustness checks

Table 6: Balance in Observable Characteristics

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | Hindu | SC/ST | Rural | Wealth Index | Household Size | Clean Fuel | Electricity | Television | Male Head | Age of Head |
| Treated x Post | 0.0286 | 0.0312 | -0.0475 | 0.157 | -0.282 | 0.0575 | -0.00169 | 0.0699 | 0.0139 | 1.895 |
|  | (0.0341) | (0.0314) | (0.0409) | (0.164) | (0.261) | (0.0467) | (0.0363) | (0.0451) | (0.0395) | (1.276) |
| Observations | 3248 | 3237 | 3248 | 3248 | 3248 | 3248 | 3248 | 3248 | 3248 | 3248 |
| R2 | 0.155 | 0.055 | 0.163 | 0.168 | 0.098 | 0.114 | 0.172 | 0.161 | 0.059 | 0.081 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.135 | 0.033 | 0.143 | 0.148 | 0.076 | 0.093 | 0.153 | 0.142 | 0.037 | 0.060 |

**Note:** * implies $p < 0.1$, ** implies $p < 0.05$ and *** implies $p < 0.01$. Source: Authors' calculation.

Robustness checks

Table 7: Falsification Test

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Twin Child | Age at Menarche | Month of Birth |
| Treated x Post | -0.00219 | -0.0154 | 0.187 |
|  | (0.00677) | (0.281) | (0.285) |
| Observations | 3237 | 1300 | 3237 |
| R2 | 0.030 | 0.042 | 0.085 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.002 | -0.026 | 0.058 |

**Note:** * implies $p < 0.1$, ** implies $p < 0.05$ and *** implies $p < 0.01$. Source: Authors' calculation.

## Robustness checks

Table 8: Difference-in-difference estimates with placebo state (Chhattisgarh)

|                | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
|                | Emotional Violence | Sexual Violence | Physical Violence | All Violence |
| Treated x Post | -0.00968 | -0.0221 | -0.0412 | -0.0505 |
|                | (0.0389) | (0.0299) | (0.0420) | (0.0466) |
| Observations   | 2983 | 2983 | 2983 | 2983 |
| R2             | 0.080 | 0.106 | 0.122 | 0.123 |
| Adjusted R2    | 0.053 | 0.080 | 0.097 | 0.097 |

**Note:** * implies $p < 0.1$, ** implies $p < 0.05$ and *** implies $p < 0.01$. Source: Authors' calculation.

Robustness checks

Table 9: Difference-in-difference estimates with placebo treatment year (2003)

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | Emotional Violence | Sexual Violence | Physical Violence | All Violence |
| Treated x Post-2003 | 0.0114 | -0.0908 | -0.00721 | -0.0867 |
|  | (0.0656) | (0.0725) | (0.0952) | (0.0947) |
| Observations | 813 | 813 | 813 | 813 |
| R2 | 0.211 | 0.183 | 0.263 | 0.260 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.126 | 0.095 | 0.184 | 0.181 |

**Note:** * implies $p < 0.1$, ** implies $p < 0.05$ and *** implies $p < 0.01$. Source: Authors' calculation.

## Robustness checks

- Excluding 2005, 2006 and 2007

Table 10: No Anticipation Assumption Check

|  | (1) Emotional Violence | (2) Sexual Violence | (3) Physical Violence | (4) All Violence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treated x Post | -0.111*** | -0.0828** | -0.147*** | -0.151*** |
|  | (0.0340) | (0.0360) | (0.0447) | (0.0496) |
| Observations | 1836 | 1836 | 1836 | 1836 |
| R2 | 0.129 | 0.110 | 0.183 | 0.182 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.085 | 0.066 | 0.142 | 0.142 |

**Note:** * implies $p < 0.1$, ** implies $p < 0.05$ and *** implies $p < 0.01$. Source: Authors' calculation.

## Robustness checks

Table 11: Difference-in-difference excluding bordering districts

|                | (1)                | (2)             | (3)               | (4)          |
|----------------|--------------------|-----------------|-------------------|--------------|
|                | Emotional Violence | Sexual Violence | Physical Violence | All Violence |
| Treated x Post | -0.0928**          | -0.0689         | -0.143**          | -0.147**     |
|                | (0.0390)           | (0.0421)        | (0.0574)          | (0.0559)     |
| Observations   | 1780               | 1780            | 1780              | 1780         |
| R2             | 0.153              | 0.124           | 0.190             | 0.203        |
| Adjusted R2    | 0.117              | 0.088           | 0.156             | 0.170        |

**Note:** * implies $p < 0.1$, ** implies $p < 0.05$ and *** implies $p < 0.01$. Source: Authors' calculation.

Robustness checks

Table 12: Difference-in-difference estimates with State-level clustering

|                            | (1)                | (2)              | (3)                 | (4)            |
|----------------------------|--------------------|------------------|---------------------|----------------|
|                            | Emotional Violence | Sexual Violence  | Physical Violence   | All Violence   |
| Treated x Post             | -0.0870**          | -0.0567**        | -0.108**            | -0.116***      |
|                            | (0.00189)          | (0.00146)        | (0.00259)           | (0.000933)     |
| p-value                    | 0.014              | 0.016            | 0.015               | 0.005          |
| Wild-bootstrapped pvalue   | 0.000              | 0.000            | 0.000               | 0.000          |
| Observations               | 2439               | 2439             | 2439                | 2439           |
| R2                         | 0.123              | 0.096            | 0.163               | 0.167          |
| Adjusted R2                | 0.090              | 0.062            | 0.131               | 0.135          |

**Note:** * implies $p < 0.1$, ** implies $p < 0.05$ and *** implies $p < 0.01$. Source: Authors' calculation.

Robustness checks

Table 13: Difference-in-difference estimates with PSM-DID

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | Emotional Violence | Sexual Violence | Physical Violence | All Violence |
| Panel A: Nearest neighbor matching |  |  |  |  |
| Treated x Post | -0.0790* | -0.0532* | -0.127*** | -0.144*** |
|  | (0.0404) | (0.0319) | (0.0468) | (0.0466) |
| Observations | 1915 | 1915 | 1915 | 1915 |
| R2 | 0.113 | 0.109 | 0.164 | 0.165 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.069 | 0.066 | 0.123 | 0.124 |
| Panel B: Radius matching |  |  |  |  |
| Treated x Post | -0.0858** | -0.0562** | -0.117*** | -0.124*** |
|  | (0.0374) | (0.0279) | (0.0413) | (0.0437) |
| Observations | 2286 | 2286 | 2286 | 2286 |
| R2 | 0.122 | 0.098 | 0.163 | 0.164 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.087 | 0.061 | 0.129 | 0.131 |

**Note:** * implies $p < 0.1$, ** implies $p < 0.05$ and *** implies $p < 0.01$. Source: Authors' calculation.

Robustness checks

Table 14: Difference-in-difference estimates with Entropy Balancing

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | Emotional Violence | Sexual Violence | Physical Violence | All Violence |
| Treated x Post | -0.0737** | -0.0516* | -0.0920** | -0.0910* |
|  | (0.0329) | (0.0268) | (0.0439) | (0.0481) |
| Observations | 2434 | 2434 | 2434 | 2434 |
| R2 | 0.120 | 0.086 | 0.148 | 0.145 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.086 | 0.051 | 0.116 | 0.113 |

**Note:** * implies $p < 0.1$, ** implies $p < 0.05$ and *** implies $p < 0.01$. Source: Authors' calculation.

## Ruling out other contemporary policies

- Bihar Bicycle policy (2006)

Table 15: Difference-in-differences estimates excluding women above Grade 9

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | Emotional Violence | Sexual Violence | Physical Violence | All Violence |
| Treated x Post | -0.0816* | -0.0770* | -0.102** | -0.126** |
|  | (0.0424) | (0.0408) | (0.0490) | (0.0521) |
| Observations | 1584 | 1584 | 1584 | 1584 |
| R2 | 0.128 | 0.125 | 0.137 | 0.140 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.075 | 0.072 | 0.085 | 0.088 |

**Note:** * implies $p < 0.1$, ** implies $p < 0.05$ and *** implies $p < 0.01$. Source: Authors' calculation.

Ruling out other contemporary policies

- *JEEViKA*: A 2006 Bihar policy aimed at promoting rural women's socioeconomic inclusion through Self-Help Groups
- *Mukhyamantri Kanya Vivah Yojana*: A 2007 Bihar initiative, offering Rs. 5,000 financial assistance to Below Poverty Line (BPL) families for the marriage of girls
- *Dhanalakshmi*: A 2008 scheme of Bihar, a conditional cash transfer program with insurance coverage for all girl children born on or after November 8, 2008
- Bihar alcohol ban (2016)

Conclusion

- Causal evidence of how a mandatory marriage registration policy can be useful in lowering domestic violence.
- Negative impact on polygamy and child marriage.
- Corruption in the civil registration system can hinder policy effectiveness.
- Mandatory registration should be combined with a broader strategy to reduce corruption in public service delivery.

***Thank you!***
*Comments and questions are welcome.*

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